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Debt, Deficits and Finite Horizons
ABSTRACT
Many issues in macroeconomics, such as the level of the steady state
interest rate, or the dynamic effects of government deficit finance, depend
crucially on the horizon of economic agents. This paper develops a simple
analytical model in which such issues can be examined and in which the
horizon of agents is a parameter which can be chosen arbitrarily.
The first three sections of the paper characterize the dynamics and
steady state of the economy in the absence of a government. The focus is on
the effects of the horizon index on the economy. The paper clarifies in
particular the separate roles of finite horizons and declining labor income
through life in the determination of steady state interest rates.
The next three sections study the effects and the role of fiscal policy.
The focus is on the effects of deficit finance both in closed and open
economies. The paper clarifies the respective roles of government spending,





(617) 253—8891This paper characterizes the dynamic behavior of an economy where agents
have finite horizons. It then analyzes the effects and the role of government
debt and deficits, of intertemDoral reallocations of taxes.
There is in general no simple aggregate consumption function in an economy
composed of finitely lived agents. This is because agents differ in two
respects. Being of different ages, they have different levels and compositions
of wealth. Having different horizons, they have different propensities to
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compositionand propensity to consume makes exact or approximate aggregation
impossible (Modigliani [19661).
In view of this problem, the solution chosen by Diamond [1965] was to choose
a very simple population and age structure, avoiding altogether the need for
aggregation. The solution chosen in this paper is, instead, to make assumptions
which allow aggregation. The central assumption is that agents face, throughout
their life, a constant instantaneous probability of death p. Thus their expected
life is p1 furthermore, it is constant throughout their life. Agents are of
different ages, have different levels of wealth but have the same horizon, the
same rropensity to consume. This allows one to solve the aggregation problem.
The main advantage of this approach is its flexibility. If we think of p1
as the horizon index, we can choose it anywhere between zero and infinity, and
study the effects of the horizon of agents on the behavior of the economy. in
particular, by letting p go to zero, we obtain the infinite horizon case as a
limiting case.
The main drawback of this approach is that it captures the finite horizon
aspect of life, but not the change in behavior over life, the 'life cycle" aspect
of life. In that respect it is closer to the initial formulation of permanent
income by Friedman [1957] than to that of life cycle by Modigliani [1966]. It iswell adapted to issues where the finite horizon aspect is important, such as the
issue of government debt. It is poorly adapted to issues where differences in
DroOenslties to consume across agents are potentially important.
The first three sections characterize the behavior of the economy in the
absence of a government. Section I derives the behavior of both individual and
aggregate consumption functions. The specification of aggregate consumption
resembles some existing specifications: aggregate consumption is a function of
aggregate financial and human wealth. The rate used to discount labor income is
higher than the interest rate. Section II studies the dynamics and steady state
of an economy composed of agents with finite horizons, both in closed and open
economies. Section III considers two extensions. The first focuses on the
effects of the elasticity of substitution of consumption. The second allows for
declininglabor income throughout life, tocapture the effects of the 'saving for
retirement"motive on capital accumulation.
The next three sections characterize the effects and role of debt and.
deficits.The government is assumedto have lump-sum taxes at itsdisposaland
thefocus is on intertemporal reallocations of taxes, rather •than on changes in
spending. Section IV introduces the government budget constraint and shows how
finite horizons imply a role for debt policy. It studies whether and how an
index of fiscal policy can be defined and how it evolves over time for particular
reallocations of taxes. Section V shows the steady state effects of fiscal
policy in the closed and open economies; Section VI characterizes its dynamic
effects, by considering two examples. The first, inspired by the current fiscal
policy in the U.S. is that of a reallocation which creates high deficits followed
later by surpluses. The second, which leads to the study of optimal debt policy,
studies the role of debt policy in smoothing aggregate consumption in the face of
regular fluctuations in output.3
Section I. The Aggregate Consumption Function
The derivation of aggregate consumption is based on twomajor assumptions.
The first specifies the probability of death and the structureof
population: Time is continuous. Each agent, throughout his life facesa constant
instantaneous probability of death r1'2. At any instant of time,a large cohort,
whose size is normalized to be p, is born.
If the probability of death is constant, the expectedremaining life for an
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agent of any age is given by 5o tpedt =p .Weshall refer to pas the
horizon index. As we let p go to zero, p1 goes to infinity: agents have
infinite horizons.
The assumDtion that cohorts are large implies that, although eachagent is
uncertain about time of death, the size of a cohort declines non—stochastically
through time. A cohort born at time zero has a size, as of time t, of pePt, and
t
C the size of the population at anytime t is jpetSds =1.
In the absence of insurance, uncertainty about death implies thatagents may
leave unanticipated bequests although they have no heauest motive.They may also
be constrained to maintain a positive wealth position if theyare prohibited from
leaving debt to their heirs. Under our assumptions, private marketsmay however
provide insurance risklessly and it is reasonable and convenient to assume that
they do so. This motivates the second assumption:
There exist life insurance companies. Agents may contract to make (or
receive) a payment contingent upon their desth.
Because of the large number of identical agents, such contractsmay he
offered risklessley by life insurance companies. Given free entry anda zero4
profit condition, and given a probability of death p, agents will pay (receive) a
rate p to receive (pay) one good contingent on their death.
In the absence of a bequest motive, and if negative bequests are prohibited,
agents will contract to have all of' their wealth (positive or negative) return to
the life insurance company contingent on their death. Thus, if their wealth is
w, they will receive pw if they do not die, pay w if they die.
These two assumptions are sufficient to characterize aggregate consumption.
For simplicity, we shall however make two further assumptions. The first, which
implies a simple individual consumption function, is that utility is logarithmic.
The second, which implies a simple form for aggregate human wealth is that labor
income is distributed equally across agents. We shall relax these two
assumptions in Section III.
Individual consumption
Denote by c(s,t), y(s,t), w(s,t), h(s,t) consumption, non—interest income,
non—human and human wealth of an agent born at time s, as of time t. Let r(t) be
the interest rate at time t. Under the assumption that instantaneous utility is
4
logarithmic, the agent maximizes:
e(t—v) logc(s,v)e dv),eo.
Given the constant probabilty of death, and if the only source of
uncertainty is about the time of death, maximizing the above is equivalent to
maximizing:
(e÷p)(t—v) log c(s,v)e dv (i)
The effective discount rate is therefore (9-I-p). Even if e is equal to zero,
agents will discount the future if p is positive.5
If an agent has wealth w(s,t) at time t, he receives r(t)w(s,t) in interest
and pw(s,t) from the insurance company. Thus its dynamic budget constraint is:
dw(s,t)/dt =(r(t)+p)w(s,t) +y(s,t)—c(s,t) (2)
An additional tranaversality condition is needed to prevent agents from
going infinitely into debt and protecting themselves by buying life insurance.
We impose a condition which is the extension of that used in the deterministic




If this is the case, the budget constraint can be integrated to give:
V
—f(r(p)+p)dt




t where h(s,t) =f y(s,v)e dv
t
The agent maximizes (1) subject to (3). This problem is very similar to the
deterministic case, except for the presence of (®+p) and (r+p) instead of :and
r. The solution is simply
c(s,t) =(p+e)(w(s,t) +h(s,t)). (4)
Individual consumption depends on total individual wealth, with propensity
(®+p). The discount rate used to discount labor income is (r+p), the same as the
rate at which non-human wealth accumulates.6
Aggregate consumption.
Denote aggregate consumption, non-interest income, non-human wealth and










t p(s-t) t _fV(r(I)+p)du p(s—t)
H(t) =5h(s,t)pe ds =5( 5 y(s,v)e dv)pe ds - -w
Fromequation (4), aggregate consumption is given by:
c(t) =(p+e)(H(t) +w(t)).
The next step is to derive the dynamic behavior of H(t) and w(t).
The dynamic behavior of H(t) depends on the distribution of labor income.
We shall assume for the moment that labor income is equally distributed across
agents, i.e. that all agents work and have the same productivity: y(s,v) =Y(v)Vs
This implies that all agents alive have the same human wealth.
H(t) is then given by:
H(t) =i;Y(v)e' (r()+p)ddv




Differentiating now w(t) with respect to time gives:7
dW(t)/dt=w(t,t)-pW(t)+ pe5_t)ds
The first term on the right is the financial wealth of newly born agents,
which is equal to zero. The second term is the wealth of those who die. The
third is the change in the wealth of those alive. Using equation (2) gives:
dW(t)/dt =r(t)W(t)+r(t)—c(t)
Collecting equations, dropping the time index t, denoting d./dt by a dot,







Whereas individual wealth accumulates, for those alive, at rate r+p,
aggregate wealth accumulates at rate r. This is because the amount pW is a
transfer, through life insurance companies of those who die to those who remain
alive; it is not therefore an addition to aggregate wealth.
Thus aggregate consumption is a linear function of total aggregate wealth.
If agents have finite horizons, if p > 0, the discount rate used to discount non—
interest income is higher than the interest rate.6 (Human wealth can be either
thought of as the present value of non—interest income discounted at rate (r+p),
or as the present value of non—interest income accruing in the future to agents
alive today, discounted at rate r).
There is an alternative characterization of the behavior of aggregate




If agents have infinite horizons, p =0and equation (8) reduces to the
standard equation (Hall[1978]for example). If p > 0, therateof change of C
dependsalso on non—human wealth. Note that even if p is positive, individual
consumption follows =(r—®)c.Thus if r0, individual consumption will be





Sectionhi. Dynamics and Steady State
We consider in turn the cases of a closed and of an open economy.
The Closed Economy
There are two factors of production, capital K, and labor; fromabove the
size of the labor force is equal to the size of populationand equal to unity.
Let F(K,1) be the constant returns to scale production function,and 6 be the
depreciation rate. Define
F(K) (K,i) -6K
Non human wealth W is equal to K. Y is labor income, which we shalldenote
now by w(K) and r is the net marginal product of capital,r(K), which may be




Figure 1 characterizes the phase diagram associated with the system.Let's
define two values of K, K* such that r(K*) =0,and K** such that r(K**)
The locus C =0is upward sloping, going through the origin and reaching
asymptotically K*. The locus K=0 traces the net production function.
The equilibrium is unique with a saddle point structure. The stable arm SS
is upward sloping. Anyothertrajectory can be shown to imply a negative level
of C or K in finite time and thus the stable arm is the only acceptable
trajectory: given K, C is uniquely determined.
The steady state level of capital K is such that r(K) is between 0 and ®-'-p.
r(K) > 0 follows from inspection of the phase diagram. r(K) < 04-pisshown10
as follows:Suppose r() > 0÷p, so that:
r()- ®>p > (r()- ®)>p
C = 0 and equation (10) > p(p+o)> p,
K = 0 and equation (ii) => p(p+ o)K > pF(K) => (p+e)> F(K)
As r(K) >O+p => r() i>F(K)which is impossible.
If p = 0, so that agents have infinite horizons, r(K)0. The modified
golden rule obtains .Whenp is positive, r(K) is larger than 9.The reason is
clear from the individual consumption equation= (r—0)c: ifl steady state,
labor income is constant throughout life. In order to generate positive
aggregate capital, agents must he saving initially, consumption must be
increasing. Thus r must be larger than 0.
Furthermore, r is an increasing function of p. The shorter the horizon, the
lower the level of capital. We shall see however in the next section that
declining labor income throughout life has the opposite effect.
Does the decentralized economy generate too much or too little capital
accumulation? If we use the subjective discount rate 0 as the relevant rate,
r() > S and the economy has too small a capital stock. If, however, we use the
effective subjective discount rate 0+p, r(K) < 0+p and the economy has too large
a capital stock.
The open economy.
In the open economy, the interest rate is the world interest rate, r, which
is fixed and at which consumers can freely borrow or lend. For simplicity, there
is no capital and the only assets are therefore the net holdings of foreign
assets, denoted F. Non—interest income is exogenous and denoted as w.Using














The first question is whether there exists a (saddle point) stable steady state.
The dynamic system is linear in C and F. It is saddle point stable if r is
between —p and ®+p. If r was larger than D+p, individual consumption would
increase at a rate larger than p, that is, larger than the rate of death;
aggregate consumption would therefore increase forever. If we exclude this case,
we have a well-defined steady state, with associated values for C and F. This
result differs sharply from the infinite horizon case where a steady state value
of C exists only if r =0and where in this case the value of F is indeterminate
(or more precisely, depends on the path of adjustment).
We construct now the phase diagram. The slope of C =0is positive if
r > 0, negative if r < 0. The slope of F0 is positive. Both cases are
represented in Figures 2a and b.In both cases, the stable arm is upward
sloping.
What are the characteristics of this steady state? If r =0,the value of F
is zero. Agents have flat labor income and consumption profiles; they do not
save or dissave. If r is greater than 0, individual consumption is increasing,
agents are accumulating over their life and the level of foreign assets is
positive. If r is smaller than 0, agents are decumulating and, as a result, the
level of foreign assetp is negative. The country is a net debtor in steady
state.
An increase in r increases the level of foreign assets. An increase in p
pushes the level of foreign assets towards zero, reducing it if positive,
increasing it if negative: shorter horizons imply smaller accumulation or
decumulation.12
An alternative way of looking at aggregate behavior is to return to the
specification giving aggregate consumption as a function of wealth and to derive
an aggregate savings function:
C =(p+®)(—---+ F)whereas income is +rF,so that:
S EY-C((r-)/(r+p))+ (r-p-)F
Asr < O+p, savings is a decreasing function of wealth F; the effect of non—
interest income w is ambiguous and depends on (r—d). In steady state
S =0.If r =3,the equilibrium level of foreign assets is zero. It is
positive if r > 6, negative if r < 0.13
Section III. Twoextensions
We consider now two extensions to the original model. The first focuses on
the effects of the elasticity of substitution of consumption, the second on the
effects of declining labor income through life.
The role of the elasticity of substitution
We now consider the class of isoelastic utility functions:
( uc1c/\1—c)
logc ,cTl.
The elasticity of substitution is given by o1. All other assumptions are
unchanged.
Following the same steps as in Section I, the first order condition to the
individual maximization problem is:
dc(s,t)/dt.o1(r(t)-)c(s,t) (14)
Solving for c(s,v), v > t as a function of c(s,t), replacing in the budget




As before, consumption is a linear function of total wealth. The propensity
to consume is now a function of the sequence of expected interest rates; it is
however not a function of age and is therefore the same for all agents. The
behavior of A(t) can equivalently be characterized by a differential equation










Following the same steps as in Section I gives the dynamic behavior of





Some manipulation gives an alternative characterization of aggregate
consumption, corresponding to equation (a) in Section I:
Ca1(r-G)C -pA1W
We shall limit our analysis to the effects of a on steady state capital in a
closed economy. The steady state is characterized by:
C =a(r(K) -e)c-pAK 0 (is)
K =F(K)—c =0 (16)
-1 - [(1-a)(r(K)+p)-(e+p)]A0 (17)
Replacing in (15) by its value for=0in (17), gives the C 0 locus:
C =p(®+ p+(a—1)(r(K)+p))/(r(K)—G)K.This locus is drawn in Figure
3.Fora > 1 ,andC > 0, this locus starts from the origin, is upward
* * *
slopingand approaches K asymptotically, where K is such that r(K )= . For
a < 1, the locus is initially downward sloping, then upward sloping. It also
*
approachesK asymptotically. These two cases are drawn in Figures 3a and 3b.
The ( =0locus traces the net production function.
*
Thesteady state capital stock is smaller than K ,thenet marginal product
r* is greater than 0. An increase in a shifts the Ô0to the left, decreasing
steady state capital. Thus, the lower the elasticity of substitution, the lower
steady state capital. Intuition for this result is obtained by examining
equation (14), giving the behavior of individual consumption. As in Section II,15
a positive aggregate capital requires savings initially in life. As labor income
is flat, this requires low and increasing consumption. The lower ,thelarger
the interest rate needed to twist the consumption path. Equivalently, the lower
the lower initial individual savings given the interest rate.
The effects of declining labor income
What we want to capture here are the effects of "saving for retirement" on
aggregate capital accumulation. Introducing retirement, that is zero labor
income after some given length of life is not analytically convenient. We assume
instead that labor income declines through life, at rate a. More precisely, we
assume:
a(s-v)
y (s,v) aY(v)e (18)
a is a constant to be determined. The share of labor income received by an agent
is an exponentially decreasing function of age. The value of a is determined by
the condition that:
v p(s—v) Y(v) = y(s,v)pe ds
=aY(v) =(pa/(p+a))Y(v)
>a=(p+a)/p.
Note that the case where a is positive is well defined only if pisstrictly
positive. If p=O, agents are infinitely long lived. Individual labor income is
the same, up to a constant, as aggregate labor income; it cannot be a decreasing
function of age.
The derivation of individual consumption is identical to that of Section I.
The derivation of aggregate consumption is also the same, except for aggregate












The effect of declining labor income is to increase the discount rate on
future aggregate labor income. This is because agents currentlyalive will
receive, even if still alive in the future, a smallerand smaller share of total
income.
Collecting equations gives the following:
c =(p+ + w) (19)
(20)
W =rW+Y—C (21)
The equation for human wealth is given in differential form;the only effect
of a is to further increase the discount rate on future labor incomeabove the
interest rate.
The alternative characterization of the dynamics, obtained by
differentiating (14) and eliminating H and W using (20) and (21) is:
(r +a—e)c—(p+a)(p+
WrW +-C
Let's now turn to the dynamics and steady state of the closed economy. The
dyiiamics are characterized by:
=(r(K)+a - e)c-(p+a)(p+0)K (22)
=F(K) -C (23)
The phase diagram associated with (22) and (23) is drawn in Figure4. The
C0 locus goes through the origin, is convex and reaches asymptotically K,
A A
wherer(K)0 —a. Notethat, as e —acan be positive or negative, K can be on17
either side of the golden rule capital stock.7 The T locus traces the net
production function.
The equilibrium is saddle point stable. The stable arm SS is upward
sloping.
What are the characteristics of the steady state capital stock? As in
Section II, the capital stock K is such that r) < e +p.Suppose it was
not. Then:
r(R) >@ +p >
(r() -0+a)>(p+a)C.
Equation (22) and= 0 > (p +a)(p+e)>(p +
Equation(23) and= 0 > (p +e)>F(K)
As rK) > ® +p > r(> F(K) which is impossible.
There is however no guarantee that r(K) > 0. Indeed, for a large enough,
r() may be negative. Using a standard terminology, the equilibrium may be, as
in Diamond, inefficient. An increase in a increases steady state capital. To
see this, consider
—(p+o)(r()-o-p)
daC = 0, K = K ,i_rtK)-0-a
As r() < ® +p,and r() > 0 —a,
dCIdatO,KK
In the neighborhood of steady state, an increase in a shifts the C0
locus to the right, increasing steady state capital.
To summarize, the effect of finite horizons per se is to decrease capital
accumulation. The effect of declining labor income, of saving for retirement is
however to increase it. The net effect is ambiguous and the steady state can be
inefficient.
We now turntothe effects of fiscal policy.18
Section IV. Effects of taxes on aggregate demand.
The government budget constraint.
We now introduce a government which spends on goods which do not affect the
marginal utility of private consumption and finances spending either by lump—sum
taxes 8, or by debt. Its dynamic budget constraint is:
D =rD+G—T
D is debt, G is spending, T taxes. We shall refer to T —Gas the surplus, or
deficit as the case may he, and to as the change in debt. This is only a







This condition, together with the dynamic budget constraint is equivalent to




Dt +Joe ds ITe ds (24)
The presence of taxes modifies slightly the aggregate consumption function
of Section I which becomes:19
c= (p+)(Ht+Wt); W =Dt
+Kt (25)
-5(r+p)dv -f(r+p)dv
Ht =5Ye ds —5Te ds (26)
(27)
Financial wealth, W, now includes government debt D and other assets, K.
Human wealth is the present discounted value of non—interest income minus taxes,
discounted at rate (r+p).
Effects of a reallocation of taxes.
Consider a decrease in taxes at time t associated with an increase at time
t +-r.Given the government budget constraint (24), and given the level of debt




The effect on the consumer at time t is given by the effect on human wealth.





or using the government budget constraint, an effect of _dTt(1 —e).Thus,
unless p =0,a decrease in taxes today increases human wealth and consumption.
The longer taxes are deferred, the larger the effect. This effect of
reallocation of taxes comes from the different discount rates in the government
budget constraint and in the definition of human wealth. This in turn reflects
the fact that taxes are partly shifted to future generations.20
An index of fiscal stance
Fiscal policy, that is, the sequence of current and anticipated taxes,
spending and debt, affects aggregate demand in three ways. Debt is part of
wealth and affects consumption; the sequence of taxes affects human wealth and
thus consumption. The level of government spending affects aggregate demand
directly. It is useful, both conceptually and technically, to summarize these
effects by an index of fiscal policy. Let g denote this index, so that,





This index can be rewritten as:




The first line gives the effects of the sequence of spending on aggregate demand
if it is financed exclusively by contemporaneous taxes. Changes in spending are
not the subject of this paper. Note however that if rC, a permanent change in
spending has no effect on aggregate demand. The second line gives the effects of
financing. Note first that if p =0,the government budget constraint (24)
implies that this line is identically equal to zero; once again financing is
irrelevant. If p is positive, this is not the case, and if Dt is positive, this
term is positive.
How does this index evolve over time for a given fiscal policy? Consider a
policy characterized by large deficits initially, followed later, as debt
accumulates, by surpluses so as to satisfy the intertemporal government budget21
constraint. Does the initial increase in g disappear as surpluses appear, or
does g remain positive as debt accumulates? An example, inspired by the current
U.S. fiscal policy, will suggest the answer. The specific fiscal policy we
consider is characterized by:
=rD
-Tt;Tt =3Dt
-o; D0 =0 (29)
Government spending is equal to zero for simplicity. Taxes are an
increasing function of the level of debt. A necessary and sufficient condition
for the government transversality condition to be satisfied is that> r, so
that an increase in debt reduces D .Theinterest rate r is assumed constant.
Consider the effect of an increase of u from zero, which implies initially a
sequence of deficits. As debt accumulates, taxes increase, surpluses appear and
debt converges to a new steady state value, D, where D =y/(B—r).The smaller
(—r), the larger the sequence of deficits, the higher the steady state level of
debt.
Solving (29) for the path of D and T, and replacing in (28) gives:
=(p+®)cy (— - e'),sothat: (30)
g0 =(p+e)u(r÷p)(+p)
g (p+e)c (r+p)-r) =(P0)---D> g0
The index of fiscal policy therefore increases over time. At time zero, it
depends on the sequence of anticipated deficits, and thus on 3.
It increases over time to reach g. The value of g is easy to understand.
In steady state, taxes required to pay interest on the debt are equal to r D.
Their present value in human wealth is (r/(r+p))D and thus the net effect of
debt is (p+)(D— (r/(r+p))D ), whichis equal to g.






Section V. Steady state effects of fiscal policy.
We return to the closed and open economies of Section II, and characterize
the effects of fiscal policy on steady state levels of assets and consumption.
The closed economy




This does not completely characterize the dynamics. A characterization of
movements in T and G which satisfies the government transversality condition is
also needed. The dynamics of the system are therefore, in general, difficult to
characterize. However we can study the dynamics of the (c, K) system for
constant values of D and C. If we consider constant values of D, D is obviously
equal to zero and thus implicitly, taxes vary to satisfy Tr(K)D +C.
We must distinguish between two cases depending on whether the level of debt
is less or greater than (_K*) where, as before, K* is such that r(K*)=E. These
two cases are drawn in Figures 5a and b. Figure 5a draws the C =0locus for
three different levels of debt, zero as in Section II, positive or negative.
Figure 5b draws the Ô= 0locus when D<_K*.
If G =0,there exists, for any level of debt, a unique equilibrium. This
equilibrium is saddle point stable and the stable arm is upward sloping. All
other trajectories imply negative consumption or capital in finite time. If C is
positive however (which, on the phase diagram, shiftsthe K =0locus vertically
downwards by an amount C), there may be, if debt is larger than (_K*), zero or23
two equilibria. If there are two equilibria, one is saddle pointstable and the
other strictly unstable. The case of zero or two equilibria isnot considered
further.
The levels of capital and of consumption are decreasing functions of the
level of debt and the government can choose any level of capital by an
appropriate choice of debt. If the government uses (÷p) asthe social discount
rate, it may achieve the desired level of capital K**,such that r(K**) Cp, by
issuing a positive amount of debt. If instead it uses 0 asthe social discount
rate, it must issue a negative amount of debt, in this case preciselyin amount
(_K*). The mechanism is clear: an increase in debt implies, as debt is partly
perceived as net wealth, an increase in consumption and a decreasein capital
accumulation until a lower steady state is reached.
The flpen Economy




We may again describe the dynamics of C arid F given constant values of D
andG, that is, assuming D =0in the last equation and thus T =C+rD.
The phase diagram is shown in Figures 6a and b, which consider the cases
r > 0 and r < C .Thesystem is saddle point stable for any value of D. The
effect of an increase in D is always to decrease the steady state level ofF and
of C. This effect is easier to understand if we return to the savings function.
Consumption and income are now given respectively by
(p+0) ((w-T)/(rp)± D +F)and w -T+r(D+F).













tinder the stability condition that r is between 0 and ®+p, the propensity to
save is negative out of government debt and other financial assets, ambiguous out
of labor income. In particular if r 0:
S-pF—pD




Thus government debt displaces foreign assets in the agents' wealth. The
displacement is one for one if r =0,but may be much larger if r i greater than
0. These results again differ sharply from the infinite horizon where the level
of debt has no effect on the steady state level of F•Byits debt policy, the
government can choose any level of private consumption.
We now turn to the dynamic effects of specific fiscal policies.25
Section VI. Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Policy.
If a fiscal policy implies low debt and high deficits initially, and high
debt and surpluses in steady state, we may suspect that its dynamic effects are
quite different from its steady state effects. If the economy is closed, we want
to know the effects of the fiscal policy on the sequence of interest rates and
asset accumulation. If the economy is open and interest rates given, the focus
is on the current account and asset accumulation. We shall limit ourselves to
the analytically simpler case of an open economy and consider two examples.
Government and Current Account Deficits
We characterize the effects of a fiscal policy which resembles that of the
US. The fiscal policy is the same as the policy studied in Section IV, that is
of an initial increase at time t =0in deficits, followed later on by surpluses.
This policy is assumed to be unanticipated as of t < 0. The economy is the open




=(r—a)D—a; G =0 ; D0 =0
The alternative characterization of consumption, as a linear function of
wealth is here more convenient. In this case, it is also very convenient to use
the index of fiscal policy g, defined in Section III and derived for this
particular fiscal policy, also in Section IV. The system becomes:26
C =(p+))(F+'/(r+p)) +g
1?= rF+'i — C
=
—(—r)g +(p+0)ap/(r+p) ;g0 =(p+0)ap/(r+p)(a+D)
The effect of fiscal policy on the dynamics of C and F is entirely captured
by the single index g. The behavior of g, for the specific fiscal policy we
consider was derived in equation (30) and is written here equivalently as a
differential equation.
The dynamics of F and g are characterized in Figure 7. The F =0locus is
downward sloping, with slope (p+o-r)1 (we maintain the stability condition r < p
+0).The initial steady state is at point E. At t =0,the locus g =0shifts
to the right, g jumps from zero to a positive value, a(p9) p/(r+p)(a+p). Over
time the economy converges from A to E'.
The effect of fiscal policy is thus of a decumulation of foreign assets as
government debt accumulates. The rates of foreign asset accumulation and
government debt accumulation are not however related in any simple way: the rate
rate of foreign asset decumulation depends not only on the current deficit, but
on the entire sequence of deficits (surpluses). For example, if r =0,we have
seen in the previous section that in the long run, the decrease in foreign assets
is equal to the increase in government debt. At t =0however, the effect of the




Thus the effect is less than one for one. It tends to one as p tends to
infinity, as the horizon of agents shortens. It tends to p/(r+p) as a reaches







We learn from this example that we may think of the effects of fiscal policy
through its effects on the index g, and that although fiscal deficits will be
associated with current account deficits, there is no simple relation between the
two.
OutDut Cycles and the Role of Debt Policy.
This second example examines the effects of regular fluctuations in output
on the decentralized economy, and the role of debt in such a case.
The economy is open, and for simplicity we assume r 0.If we define total
financial wealth W as the sum of foreign assets and government debt, the
equations of motion of the previous section can be rewritten as
C -p(p+o)W
W =rW+w - C-T
=rD+G-T).
Suppose now that follows =+ sint.
What will, in the absence of fiscal policy (TD =G0), the behavior of
C and W be?
Some algebra yields:28
C asint+ 13cos t +







Theapproximations to a, 13, y, 6 hold if p and 0 are not far from zero.
If p =0,agents completely smooth outconsumption.Aggregate consumption
is constant. Agents accumulate foreign assets when u is high, decumulate when w
is low.
If p > 0, aggregate consumption is cyclical. As r =0,each agent still
has a flat consumption path. Newly born do not however have the same level of
consumption as those who die. If 0 =0,aggregate consumption moves in phase
with income, but by less.
These movements in aggregate consumption suggest a role for fiscal policy.
As r =0,the consumption of each individual is constant throughout life.
Different cohorts however have different levels of consumption. Thus, if the
social welfare function is concave in individual utilities, it is desirable to
smooth consumption across cohorts. Fiscal policy can achieve constant aggregate
consumption over time. The equations of motion above show how this can be done:
T must simply equal sin t. If all deviations of w from its meanare taxed,
consumption and wealth will be constant. Government debt and foreign assets
follow symmetric but opposite paths. As government debt increases for example,
it displaces one for one foreign assets in the agents' portfolio.29
This change in portfolio composition has no effect, in an open economy, on
eitheror r. This would not be the case if the samedebt policy was pursued in
a closed economy: variations in the capital stockwould affect both •iandr. A
characterization of optimal policy would be substantially moredifficult.30
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to characterize rigorously the effects of
intertemporal reallocations of taxes when agents have finite horizons. To that
end, manyassumptions,such as the existence of lump—sum taxes, or a constant
employment level, were madewhichneed to be removed to obtain a more realistic
characterization of the effects of debt and deficits. The aggregate consumption
function developed here seems well adapted to the task. The index of fiscal
policy should also prove useful both conceptually and empirically31
Footnotes.
1An alternative interpretation, suggested by Robert Barro, is to think not of
agents, but of families. p is then the probability that eitherthe family ends,
that is that members of the family die without children, or that the current
members of the family have no bequest motive. The assumption of a constant p is
more acceptable under this interpretation.
2How unrealistic is the assumption of a constant p ? Evidence on mortality rates
suggests low and approximately constant probabilities from age 20 to 40.After
this, mortality rates are well summarized by "Comperty's Law" (seeWetterstrand
[1983]): 1 -e1 BC1
where y is age, g is the mortality rate, B and C are positive constants.
Estimates are for example: g50 =1%;g60 =3%;g8 =16%;g10067%.
3The role of insurance when there is uncertainty about time of death was studied
by Yaari [1965] An equivalent assumption is that there exists actuarial bonds.
Lenders lend to intermediaries. These claims are cancelled by the death of the
lenders. Borrowers borrow from intermediaries; these claims are cancelled by
death of the borrowers. Intermediation can again be done riskiessly.32
The assumption of a constant probability of death implies that theobjective
function (equation (i)) does not change through time. There is thereforeno
issue of time consistency.
5This condition is the extension to infinite time of the conditionproposed by
Yaari [1965].
6Such a specification, allowing for a higher discount rate for humanwealth, has
been estimated by Hayashi [1982]. His estimated coefficients,a, u, p are
related to p, 0, r by: p ri—p ;0 =a—+ p; rp. His estimates (Table 1,
=0)imply, at annual rates:
p =.10;r =.03;0 =—.03
7As there is no population growth in this model, the golden rule is that thenet
marginal product of capital be equal to zero, r(K)0.
8The assumption that the government can use lump-sum taxation is made to focuson
the effects of finite horizons. As is well understood, if lump—sum taxation is
not available, there is a role for debt policy even if agents have infinite
horizons.33
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